Agentic Context & MCP Server

Ashlar Blue natively supports the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and standardized LLM ingestion formats, allowing autonomous AI agents to query DNS discovery, verify hardware attestation quotes, and execute zero-gas settlements without DOM scraping.

STANDARD AGENT INDEX
Open ↗
https://ashlar.blue/llms.txt
MODEL CONTEXT PROTOCOL (MCP) MANIFEST
Manifest ↗
https://ashlar.blue/.well-known/mcp.json
OFFICIAL TRUST SDK (NPM)
npm i @ashlar-blue/x402-trust
IETF PAYMENT MANIFEST
Raw ↗
https://ashlar.blue/.well-known/x402
Declared MCP Agent Tools (JSON-RPC 2.0):
• discover_x402_endpoint
Queries IANA _x402 apex TXT record via DNSSEC.
• verify_tdx_quote
Validates Intel TDX hardware MRTD hashes against immutable blockchain data availability.
• canonicalize_jcs_payload
RFC 8785 deterministic JSON formatting engine.
• submit_gasless_settlement
Submits signed EIP-3009 payload for $0.00 gas settlement.
• verify_agent_identity
Validates hardware-attested agent credentials and scope (x402 Identity WG).
• generate_tax_receipt
Emits deterministic JCS tax lines & SCITT audit receipts (x402 Tax WG).
DEVELOPER LAB ➔
Hardware Confidential Compute · Multi-Silicon Fabric

Universal Silicon TEEs, Hardware Attestation & Private Inference

Eliminating blind counterparty trust. Private signing keys, AI model weights, and autonomous agent execution state run isolated inside silicon-encrypted enclaves (Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, NVIDIA GPU CC, AWS Nitro) with cryptographic proof certificates anchored to immutable blockchain data availability.

SCITT Attestation Spec ↗ Silicon Architecture ↓
Foundational Architecture // The Hardware Security Perimeter

What is a Hardware Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)?

In standard cloud computing, whenever software runs on AWS, Google Cloud, or a bare-metal server, the underlying operating system kernel, the virtualization hypervisor, and the hosting provider's datacenter administrators have unrestricted read and write access to physical RAM. For autonomous AI agents holding financial signing keys, private user context, or proprietary model weights, this standard hosting model creates an unacceptable attack surface: credentials can be dumped from memory, execution code can be secretly patched, and transactions can be front-run.

A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a physically isolated hardware partition within the CPU or GPU chip itself. When an enclave boots, the physical silicon activates dedicated cryptographic hardware engines that encrypt every byte of memory with AES keys generated on-chip by hardware true-random number generators (TRNG). The cloud hypervisor and root administrators are strictly locked outside the trust boundary.

Crucially, the CPU silicon measures the exact cryptographic hash of all software and data loaded into the enclave into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) and generates a hardware-signed Attestation Quote rooted in the chip manufacturer's public key infrastructure (Intel, AMD, or NVIDIA). This mathematical proof allows any remote agent across the internet to verify that the code running inside the enclave is authentic, untampered, and executing in genuine confidential silicon.

Hardware Diversity // Multi-Silicon Fabric

Multi-Silicon Support: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP & NVIDIA GPU CC

Ashlar Blue is hardware-agnostic by design and legally protected under our official U.S. Patent Application #64/143,781. Our attestation verifier unifies diverse enterprise silicon into a single standard:

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX): Hardware-isolated virtual machines with Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) and Measurement Root of Trust (MRTD) hardware certificates.
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV-SNP): Full memory encryption with hardware state protection and VCEK cryptographic attestation certificates.
NVIDIA Hopper / Blackwell Confidential Computing (GPU TEEs): End-to-end PCIe encryption and GPU VRAM isolation, allowing open-weights LLMs (Llama 3, DeepSeek, Mistral) to run private inference where prompt context and model weights remain 100% unobservable.
Flare Data Connector & Secure Enclave Feeds: Direct hardware ingestion of Flare FDC and FTSO oracle streams directly into the enclave boundary before authorizing settlement.

Silicon Security // MKTME

Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Architecture

All memory pages allocated to an Ashlar Blue execution enclave are encrypted using hardware AES keys generated on-chip by the CPU. Even hypervisors, cloud operators, and compromised host OS administrators cannot inspect or modify runtime memory.

// Universal Hardware Security Boundary Enclave Trust Boundary: CPU/GPU Silicon Core + Memory Encryption Engine Supported Architectures: Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, NVIDIA H100/B200 CC, AWS Nitro Protected Assets: Agent Private Keys, LLM Weights, Private Feeds, Settlement State Adversary Model: Untrusted Cloud Host, Malicious Hypervisor, Root Admin
Cryptographic Ledger // Immutable DA

MRTD Measurement Root Verification

The Measurement Root of Trust (MRTD) hash is a 256-bit cryptographic digest representing the exact binary code and initial state loaded into the enclave. Counterparties verify this hash against immutable blockchain records before authorizing payments.

{ "attestationType": "intel-tdx-v4", "mrtd": "0x7f83b1657ff1fc53b92dc18148a1d65dfc2d4b1fa3d677284addd200126d9069", "daBlockAnchor": "0xda9142f8...18492810", "status": "VERIFIED_VALID" }
IETF Alignment // draft-scitt-attested-payment

SCITT Attested Payment Binding

Hardware attestation quotes are formatted as standard EAT/CWT tokens bound directly to the payment authorization envelope, ensuring unforgeable provenance across all counterparty audits.

POST /api/facilitator/settle X-Payment-Attestation: Base64(EAT_CWT_TDX_QUOTE)
Silicon Specs

Enclave Parameters

  • • Architecture: Intel TDX v4 / SGX
  • • Encryption: AES-128 / XTS-AES-256
  • • Root of Trust: MRTD + RTMR[0..3]
  • • Ledger Anchor: Immutable Blockchain DA
MCP Attestation Tool

Verify Hardware Quote

verify_tdx_quote(quoteHex, daBlock)